On September 6, 1941 Ambassador Oshima made a report concerning Germany's growing economic control over the Balkan States with the exception of Turkey. He declared that since Germany's imports were in excess of its exports especially in its trade with Rumania, it had resorted to changing the exchange rate in its own favor. In addition to this Germany had exported large quantities of arms to these countries, thus strengthening itself militarily as well as adjusting its trade balance.
Ambassador Oshima also revealed that an optimistic view prevailed in the Balkan states in regard to the new period plans[1111] which were designed to increase production since at the present time agriculture appeared to be in an extremely primitive state. However, by supplying implements and fertilizers, the German government hoped to prevent a decline in agricultural production and, depending upon such endeavor, might eventually be able to increase by 50,000 tons such oil bearing crops as soy beans. However, no general radical increase in agricultural production could be expected within the next two or three years.[1112]
According to Ambassador Oshima, by strict control, Germany was assuring itself of the Balkan supply which was larger than in previous years. The commercial and economic implications of Germany's plan to develop the River Danube water route connecting it with the Rhine to facilitate uninterrupted shipment of petroleum, grains, lumber, etc., were emphasized in regards to the future prosperity of Europe.[1113]
According to Minister Sikao Matashima the German army's activities had only slightly affected agricultural production in the Balkans, and harvest appeared even better than in previous years. There was a resulting tendency toward collaboration of additional Balkan countries with the Reich. These nations were operating under a produce pact with Germany in accordance with which they were supplying raw materials in exchange for German war materials, farm tools, medicines, etc. The mark became the unit of exchange in all trade transactions between Germany and the Balkans. Trade between the Balkan nations themselves was to be regulated in the Berlin Exchange Control Bureau with all loans to Germany being repaid by manufactured articles. This, it will be seen, established a virtual Balkan trade block in which Germany controlled an export market and would be economically sovereign. Germany now was getting more arms from the Balkans and transporting them over safer routes. Although currency exchange rates were unstable at present, Minister Matashima was confident that after Germany had won the Russian war, the situation would improve.[1114]
452. German Army Plans to Advance Along Leningrad-Sverdlovsk Railroad After Leningrad Falls
On September 3, 1941, a message transmitted from Moscow to Tokyo on the progress of Russo-German hostilities was re-broadcast to Hsinking despite the previous warning of Ambassador Oshima in Berlin that Japan should be more cautious of Russian reports. In this case, however, it was predicted that, after the capture of Leningrad, one part of the German army would advance along the line of the Leningrad-Sverdlovsk railroad and other part, the main force, would advance with the central army toward Moscow.
Should the Germans be successful in dealing Russia a knockout blow in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov, it would be but a brief step to the oil fields of Grozny. With the withdrawal from these three important cities Russia would lose four-fifths of its war industries.
The same report revealed that the Soviet Republics' government outwardly appeared calm. As yet there were no signs of collapse in the Red army which stubbornly resisted the Germans
[1111] III, 836. Five or ten year plan worked out or put into effect in the Balkan States.
[1112] III, 836.
[1113] III, 837.
[1114] III, 838.
[229]
in its attempt to carry on a long war. But it was predicted that soon the army would deteriorate, and such possibilities, it was believed, were causing much concern in America and England.[1115]
On September 4, 1941, Ambassador Oshima reported activities at the front as they had been explained by a reliable German source. In this statement the encirclement of Leningrad had been completed with the occupation of Slusselburg. Among the prisoners captured during the fighting in this neighborhood were armed citizens as well as workers operating tanks. The strategy involved in taking the city was to rely principally upon shelling and bombing and to avoid street fighting.
With regard to activities in the Kiev area it was believed that since Soviet forces to the east could no longer retreat, mopping-up activities would be completed in the following week.
German forces had crossed the Dnieper River all along the line from Dnepropetrovsk south and were gaining steadily.[1116]
453. Rumors of Mobilization on Bulgarian-Turkish Border Disproved
From Turkey came rumblings of massive troop concentrations on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In order to obtain first-hand information Japanese representatives there made an official trip to Bulgaria, where it was discovered that not more than eleven Bulgarian divisions and not more than five German regiments were located. Hence, although at first it had been thought that Field Marshal Sigmund Liszt's army was stationed there, later data seemed to disprove this theory.
With regard to Turkish-German relations, it was believed that Germany would not be inclined to hurry her negotiations until the eastern front had been brought under control even though trade negotiations had been scheduled to begin on September 2, 1941.[1117]
454. Ambassador Oshima Tours Occupied European Countries
On September 8, 1941 Ambassador Oshima advised Foreign Minister Toyoda that he would leave the following day for a tour of German occupied territories in Belgium, the Netherlands and northern France at the invitation of the German government.[1118]
455. Ambassador Oshima Again Threatens Resignation
Again on September 20, 1941, Ambassador Oshima threatened Tokyo with his resignation if Japan did not clarify its intentions with regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Complaining that such an explanation as the Foreign Minister had transmitted on September 10, 1941,[1119] was little more than routine diplomatic material, Ambassador Oshima stated that it was impossible for him to know the truth regarding his own government. The pro-Axis Ambassador continued that although outwardly the Japanese government claimed that the Japanese-American negotiations would not violate the spirit of the Three Power Agreement, he was doubtful.
Asserting that he had been "in a fog" since July 2, 1941 when the national policy was decided, Ambassador Oshima stated that he felt incapable of performing his duties satisfactorily.[1120]
[1115] III, 839.
[1116] III, 840.
[1117] III, 841.
[1118] III, 842.
[1119] III, 843.
[1120] III, 844.
[230]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
456. German National Defense Ministry Estimates Current Situation
The Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo forwarded to the Washington delegation an estimate of the current situation on September 20, 1941. This estimate, reportedly originating from the German attache in the United States, had been sent to the Japanese representatives in Berlin by the German National Defense Ministry; and Tokyo requested that its authenticity be investigated in Washington. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The German attache was credited with stating that if Japan attacked Russia, England would aid the Soviet Union; but that unless Japan attacked the Philippines or seriously menaced the American transport routes, the United States would not declare war against Japan. This reluctance on the part of America would greatly decrease its prestige in the Pacific area. He stressed that it was of vital importance to the Axis Powers that the United States be kept in "some dilemma" concerning Far Eastern problems.
Employing a policy of delay because its fleet was divided between two oceans and because its air force and army were lacking in strength, the United States was attempting to use economic pressure to conceal its weaknesses. The German attache pointed out that if Japan procrastinated, the British and Americans would have had time to combine their naval strength and Japan would have "lost an excellent prize by chasing the sun".[1121]
457. Japan Repudiates Poland
Although Ambassador Oshima had failed in his efforts to persuade former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka that Japan should accede in Germany's demand that Poland be repudiated, it appeared by August 15, 1941, that under the new Cabinet, final steps in this direction would be taken. The Japanese Ambassador was notified that after talking with Ambassador Ott, Foreign Minister Toyoda had agreed to call a special meeting of the Privy Council in September at which time the Japanese Embassy in Poland would be abolished and the Polish Embassy in Japan would be repudiated.[1122] However, circumstances prohibited the presentation of this request to the Privy Council before October and the Council was not expected to give its approval until October 3, 1941, at which time the Polish Ambassador would be notified.[1123]
458. Germany Explains the Greer Incident
Meanwhile, on September 8, Germany's Vice Minister Ernst Von Weizsacker accounted to Tokyo via Ambassador Oshima for the Greer incident which involved a German submarine attack on a United States warship. He explained that the submarine upon approaching the vessel for identification purposes had been fired upon. However, he said, although attacked, the submarine dove and waited two hours during which the attack continued; and then it surfaced, sighted the warship, and released two torpedoes in self-defense.
At Ambassador Oshima's query as to Germany's intention in the matter, the Vice Minister replied that he did not know Hitler's intentions but personally he did not believe that too much ado should be made about it. According to Ambassador Oshima, President Roosevelt appeared to be using the incident to stir up a war spirit in the United States. Nevertheless, Ambassador Oshima believed that since no diplomatic steps had been taken, nothing more would come of the affair.[1124]
459. Ambassador Oshima Learns of German Transactions for South American Money
On September 11, 1941, Ambassador Oshima divulged that Germany was holding large sums of money in South American branch banks which it was attempting to obtain before the
[1121] III, 845-846.
[1122] III, 847.
[1123] III, 848.
[1124] III, 849.
[231]
American freezing order went into effect. These assets Berlin hoped to obtain primarily by selling gold, but also by affixing the funds held by Germans in South America, purchasing raw materials, and by "bootlegging" South American currencies.[1125]
Only four days later the Ambassador revealed that transactions were being made at 10 per cent under the market price by German representatives in Lisbon with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.[1126]
460. New Japanese-German Shipping Problems Arise
Meanwhile some new questions were arising regarding neutral shipping. Ambassador Oshima wired his home government on September 17, 1941 to explain its decisions on several points. Items under discussion by the army and navy and Japanese merchants in Berlin involved the transporting of freight. Such problems involved an interpretation of the word "neutral", a decision as to type of freight, and the necessity for obtaining navicerts.
Ambassador Oshima also explained that the Berlin contingent desired that all freight be collected at Marseilles and then shipped by water to Lisbon thereby eliminating the use of the inefficient Spanish railroads. In this regard he wanted to know whether or not there would be an official British inspection and if so how thorough such a search would be.[1127]
461. The German Army Reaches Leningrad
By September 15, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that the German army had completely surrounded Kiev's east side, resulting in the encirclement of nearly 1,000,000 Russian soldiers. To the north other divisions had reached the Leningrad suburbs. The sudden invasion of the Crimea had already proved successful although during operations the German General Eugen Ritter von Schobert had been killed.[1128]
In defensive tactics, Ambassador Oshima emphasized the superiority of the German military, comparing the extent of the damage by bombing done to Hamburg to that of London. According to his report, little damage to communication organization had been inflicted and anti-aircraft guns and camouflage maneuvers had been most effective. Apparently, the English were not risking large numbers of men in group bombings.[1129]
462. Ambassador Oshima Inspects Bombing at Hamburg
While inspecting the harbor at Hamburg immediately after its pounding, Ambassador Oshima on September 10, 1941 reaffirmed the German statement that little damage had been accomplished. He noted that four submarines were then under construction while German sources revealed that one ship a week was being completed.
Although German industrial and munitions factories were being hit, little damage in general had been accomplished. However, it was admitted that the Mannheim Castle had sustained heavy losses.[1130]
463. Respective Treatments of Russian and German Nationals Reviewed
At this point, confusing stories regarding the respective treatments of stranded nationals and people of occupied areas were being disseminated by Germans and Russians alike. According to Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa in Moscow, the Soviet government had been ban-
[1125] III, 850.
[1126] III, 851.
[1127] III, 852.
[1128] III, 853.
[1129] III, 854.
[1130] III, 855.
[232]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
ishing German nationals to Siberia and Turkestan upon 48 hours notice and already had ordered the compulsory removal of 600,000 Germans from the Volga area.
On the other hand, the Germans through refugee spokesman were spreading counter propaganda, apparently advancing their own generosity to all peoples of the occupied areas. Stressing the fact that they had been supplying food and places of shelter, the Nazis had succeeded in influencing even greater numbers of peoples so that still fewer persons believed Soviet stories of German atrocities. Accordingly, Ambassador Tatekawa stated that the numerous Soviet propaganda articles were becoming conspicuous. To him, such stories seemed to be only an outlet for Russian impatience with the unfavorable war conditions.[1131]
464. Ambassador Suma Confers with General Franco
On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Yakichiro Suma in Madrid expressed opinions resulting from a conversation with General Franco at the Parudo[1132] Palace on the previous day. According to this report, the Axis had succeeded in destroying more than half of the Soviet army, and within a month's time the military phase of the Russo-German conflict would be ended.
However, it was recognized that because of the policy of scorched earth being carried out by a strongly united Communistic people, it was possible that they would withdraw into the Turkestan region to continue resistance. Therefore, Ambassador Suma recognized that an Axis compromise with Stalin could not be considered. Germany would have to annihilate the Soviet Army completely.[1133] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ambassador Suma continued with General Franco's views, divulging that the Axis need have no fear of American or British troop landings on Gibraltar, which was obviously too narrow, or in Portugal, which would be swallowed up by Spain should she afford any opportunity of an invasion to the enemy. However, care should be taken against the United States' occupying Dakar and Cape Verde preparatory to its entrance into the war.[1134]
465. Axis Powers Develop Communications Intelligence
Colonel Senjuro Hayashi in a dispatch to the Head of the General Affairs Section in Tokyo dated September 22, 1941 requested an outline of the procedure to be used in sending British messages. Insomuch as he had asked Major Nishi to deliver this material to the Germans during his absence, he felt that he must know immediately how his country planned to handle these wires. Colonel Hayashi remarked that the Germans had expressed their appreciation for the material they had received and conveyed his congratulations to Lt. Colonel Kawamura and to Mr. Sueyoshi on the success of their cryptanalytic work.[1135]
On the same day another message from Berlin to Tokyo suggested that Lt. Colonel Scholz of the German OKW ABWEHR[1136] be awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, third class, at the same time that Mr. Kemp would receive his commendation. The reason for further bestowing an award on Lt. Colonel Scholz who had received the Order of the Rising Sun, fourth class, was that as head of the communications of the attache office, he had given meritorious service, particularly in regard to German-Japanese joint cryptanalytic work.[1137]
From Bangkok to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo came a list of steps which should precede air operations in British Malaya. It was suggested on September 26 that if these operations were being considered, there should be a thorough-going reenforcement of the
[1131] III, 856.
[1132] Kana spelling.
[1133] III, 857.
[1134] III, 858.
[1135] III, 859.
[1136] Kana spelling.
[1137] III, 860.
[233]
air units in Saigon. An accurate utilization of the detailed intelligence already collected and the establishment of spy networks would be necessary as well as the execution of wind-speed observation with balloons having radio-sounding equipment, twice daily, in at least five places. These were to include Saigon, Hanoi, and Heito.[1138]
466. Communications Difficulties Noted in Switzerland
Ambassador Oshima's plea for clearer coverage of his government's policies were echoed from Bern, Switzerland, on September 1, 1941, by Consul Takanobu Mitani who suggested that as a result of the difficulty in maintaining communications between Japan and its various outlying stations, some steps should be taken to rectify the situation. In this regard, he proposed that in view of the increase of news of the day and the necessity for its immediate distribution one broadcast a day would last too long if it covered all the news. Henceforth over the Switzerland station two separate periods lasting from 40 to 60 minutes each would be inaugurated, to be scheduled approximately as 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
In harmony with this new plan for reducing the time of an individual broadcast but increasing the over-all coverage of the news, Consul Mitani explained that the content of each broadcast from Bern would be increased while a more careful selection of the news to avoid repetition would be practised. The plan was to give explanations of new place names and personal names. To this end it was decided to arrange for an immediate change in wave length and to distribute reference material.[1139]
467. Berlin and Tokyo Negotiate for Improved Communications
It will be remembered that negotiations had been initiated between Berlin and Tokyo to determine a more efficient and satisfactory method for settling the communication difficulties between Japan and Germany prevalent at this point. An agreement, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire submitted by Ambassador Oshima, was approved on August 20, 1941 by authorities in Tokyo. This placed the authority for concluding the technical arrangements in the hands of officials of the German and Japanese Broadcasting Companies. Another plan gave ultimate authority to the German and Japanese governments. Of the two plans submitted, Foreign Minister Toyoda approved of the one sanctioning the least possible "meddling" of foreign officials with the private broadcasting companies. However, he stated that in case the German authorities requested it, he had no objections to entering the statement that liaison officers would attend to the business of contracting the broadcasting company according to Foreign Office instructions from the respective countries.[1140]
After conferring with the German government, Ambassador Oshima replied to the Foreign Minister on September 1, that he had been informed by German authorities, that with the growing importance of radio in the world situation they had already established a diplomatic post of radio attache in Tokyo and in other of the important capitols throughout the world. In addition Germany placed much importance upon radio as being an integral part of the functions of a state, and as for leaving anything but the program details up to direct negotiations between the broadcasting companies, it was made clear to Tokyo that Germany was not in accord, furthermore that it expected to retain the right to have the final say in all matters having political implications.
Ambassador Oshima hurried to make it clear to the Foreign Minister that Germany had no intention of interfering with the organizations of foreign countries which had been specifically established to conduct informative and propaganda work, but believed that the matter would have to be arranged and settled in its entirety through governmental negotiations or have the
[1138] III, 861.
[1139] III, 862.
[1140] III, 863.
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